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Abstract
In this paper we examine ten concrete propositional update operations of the literature. We start
by completely characterizing their relative strength and their computational complexity. Then we
evaluate the competing update operations with respect to the postulates proposed by Katsuno and
Mendelzon. It turns out that the majority violates most of the postulates. We argue that all violated
postulates are undesirable except one. After that we evaluate the update operations with respect
to another property which has been investigated extensively in the literature, viz. that disjunctive
updates should not be identified with the exclusive disjunction. We argue that this is desirable, and
show that the argument gives further support to the rejection of two of the postulates. Finally we
study how the different approaches accommodate general laws governing the world, alias integrity
constraints. Summing up our results, we conclude that only two of the update operations are
satisfactory. Ó 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Belief change; Belief update; Update postulates; Minimal change; Possible models approach;
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1. Introduction
A database being a device to store and retrieve information, it has been proposed by
Levesque [27] to view a database as being equipped with a querying function ASK and an
update function TELL. ASK(light-on) is a query meaning that the database is asked whether
it follows from the data contained in it that the light in question is on.
TELL(light-on) is an update meaning that light-on is a new piece of data which the
database should take into account. This is a much fuzzier requirement than that for ASK.
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The easiest case seems to be when the input light-on is already in the database (or follows
from it) and there is no need to act. 2 Things get more complex if light-on does not follow
from the current database, and they get even harder if light-on contradicts it. In early
database systems it had been considered that the new data should be systematically rejected
in the latter case. Such a trivial TELL-function is unsatisfactory in most applications. Other
approaches such as the introduction of so-called ‘null values’ in relational databases turned
out to be problematic as well (cf. the discussion in [38, Section 1.1]). 3
1.1. What changes?—updates versus revisions
Several authors coming from the database field such as Winslett, Katsuno, Mendelzon,
Satoh and Grahne have linked the problematics of database updating to that of belief
change as studied by philosophers in the field of formal epistemology. There, what is
studied are operations  mapping a current belief base B and an input A to a new belief
base B A. (We shall henceforth synonymously use the terms database and belief base.)
Alchourròn, Gärdenfors and Makinson had established in the eighties a set of rationality
postulates that every reasonable belief revision operation should satisfy (the AGM
postulates), and had proved characterization theorems.
It has been claimed that there is the following fundamental semantical difference
between update operations and AGM revision operations.
• If the input does not correspond to a change in the real state of affairs then the belief
base should be revised: change takes place only at the knowledge level, i.e., within
the beliefs that are held about a fixed real state of affairs;
• If the input mirrors changes in the real state of affairs then the belief base should be
updated.
The difference between these two operations has been pointed out first in [25], and has
been taken up in [24]. In the case of an update, when the belief base is notified of a change
occurring in the real state of affairs by a TELL-operation, the description of the possible
states of affairs must be modified accordingly. The classical explanation as given in [18] is
as follows.
Since we are confined to our set of possibilities, we must make the change come true
in all of our candidate worlds. Semantically, we change each of the possible worlds
‘as little as possible’ in order to make the new state of affairs hold. Our new syntactic
description of the worlds of interest should now correctly reflect the outcome of this
set of changes. The function that maps the old description to the new is called an
update.
Katsuno and Mendelzon have based such a notion of minimal change on orderings
of closeness (or similarity) between possible worlds, in much the same way as it has
2 Note nevertheless that we might want to strengthen the degree of certainty (degree of belief, acceptance, . . . )
of the piece of data light-on.
3 There is another function dual to TELL which has been discussed in the literature, that is called erasure or
contraction, which retracts data from the database. We shall not treat it in this paper, one of the reasons being that
it can be defined from the TELL-function via the so-called Harper identity [16,24].
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been done by Lewis in conditional logics [28]. Paralleling the AGM postulates, Katsuno
and Mendelzon have then characterized these models by a set of postulates that every
reasonable belief update operation should satisfy (the KM postulates).
It can be shown [21, Theorem 22, p. 218] that update operations are not only different
from AGM-revision operations, but even incompatible with them (in the sense that
there is no operation that satisfies both the AGM and the KM postulates). Given that
incompatibility, what remains is a practical problem: in a given situation, which change
operation should we choose? Things are clear in the case, e.g., of fault diagnosis or
detective stories, where the real world usually does not evolve any more: A murder or
a fault in a circuit has occurred, and the detective revises his beliefs in the light of new
information about that fixed picture. But in a lot of cases we ignore whether the input
corresponds to an event in the real world or not.
It has been proposed, e.g., in [8,24] to view incoming information as time-stamped:
the current belief base being labelled with t , when a belief labelled t ′ comes in then we
choose revision if t = t ′, and update else. In fact this amounts to explicitly say “revise” or
“update”. But in everyday situations (as well as, e.g., in robotics) we might hesitate over
the choice of the change operation, and we cannot presuppose that incoming information
is time-stamped.
1.2. What is minimal change?
The KM postulates give us the abstract properties of update operations with respect to
the logical and metalogical operators of classical logic. One might expect that the set of
postulates characterizes one single update operation: the ‘right’ one. 4 Is this the case,
i.e., is there a unique operation such that for every description of the world and input
computes the correct resulting belief base? First of all, we note that if such a  exists
then our description of the world should not only contain the current belief base, but also
something like a set of laws governing the world.
The answer is negative: the class of update operations admitted by the KM-postulates is
not a singleton. (Worse, it contains the trivial update operation which retains the input (and
destroys the belief base) when it does not follow from the belief base.) Semantically, this
corresponds to the fact that there is more than one ordering of closeness between possible
worlds. In the case of conditionals, Lewis [28, pp. 94–95] has stressed that this had been
done deliberately, and that there are no context-independent closeness criteria. He predicts
failure of “any humanly possible attempt at a precise definition of comparative similarity
of worlds. Not only would we go wrong by giving a precise analysis of an imprecise
concept; our precise concept would not fall within—or even near—the permissible range
of variation of the ordinary concept”. In the case of AGM revision, Gärdenfors [17, p. 11]
remarks that “the postulates . . .do not uniquely characterise the revision in terms of only
the database and the input. This is, however, as it should be. I believe it would be a mistake
to expect that only logical properties are sufficient to characterise the revision process”.
4 Compare this to the case of the deduction relation for classical logic: Gentzen’s rules can be viewed as
describing the interplay between the deduction relation ` and the Boolean connectives, and they are sufficient to
characterize a unique `.
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Lewis and Gärdenfors probably have in mind that we are not able to appropriately
handle the description of the the world, and in particular the laws governing the world.
Following Goodman, Lewis [28, p. 73] discusses the following solution: “whenever the
laws prevailing at i are violated at a world k but not at a world j, j is closer than k to i”.
In other words, we should look for the closest worlds among those not violating the laws.
This is a solution which has been widely used in artificial intelligence in order to implement
integrity constraints, which are nothing else than non-logical laws. 5
Lewis rejects such a solution because he thinks that laws should be defeasible. While
such a position is satisfactory from the philosophical point of view, it is unsatisfactory for
people in the database field and in AI, who are looking for explicit constructions such as
algorithms or procedures. Fortunately, in many computer science applications the integrity
constraints can be considered to be undefeasible, and Lewis’ criticism does not apply.
1.3. How can we compare update operations?
In the AI literature several concrete, unique update operations have been proposed.
They have been criticized, usually by means of counterexamples, leading to alternative
approaches, and so on.
The different approaches as well as their criticisms are based on several hypotheses,
which are more or less explicitly stated in the literature:
(1) A belief base describes what is believed by an agent about the ‘real state of affairs’
(or ‘the actual world’). This description consists of a set of propositional formulas.
(2) The agent entertaining the belief base has sensors permitting him to acquire infor-
mation about facts of the actual world. Such information consists of propositional
logic formulas.
(3) The agent supposes that the input information describes an event that has happened
in the actual world.
(4) The agent changes his beliefs in the belief base in such a way that the latter sticks
as close as possible to what he believes to know about the actual world.
(5) The agent does not always know whether sensing is noisy or not, and whether there
is misperception or not.
Now, our question is: how can we compare these operations, and how can we evaluate
them with respect to both the KM postulates and other important requirements, such as
the correct handling of integrity constraints? There are several ways to do this.
• One can study the computational properties of the update operations, in particular
their theoretical complexity (complexity of the decision problem).
This will be done in Section 3, where we present the operations that we study.
• One can compare their strength. We consider that an operation 1 is stronger than
2 if for every belief base the set of possible worlds obtained by updating with 1
contains those obtained with 2.
We shall give such an ordering of strength in Section 4.
• One can evaluate the competing update operations with respect to the KM-postulates.
5 But such a solution has been criticized as well, as discussed in Section 7.
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We shall do that in Section 5. It will turn out that the majority violates most of the
postulates. Based on our hypotheses, we shall argue that all violated postulates are
undesirable except one.
• One can postulate other properties that update operations should satisfy, and then
evaluate the update operations with respect to them.
We shall examine in Section 6 a negative requirement that has been investigated
extensively in the literature, viz. that disjunctive input should not be identified with
the exclusive disjunction. We argue that this is desirable, giving further support to the
rejection of some postulates.
• One can study how the different approaches accommodate with general laws
governing the world, alias integrity constraints.
This will be done in Section 7. Here the comparison is done by examples. It turns out
that only two approaches can handle these examples correctly.
But first of all we recall some more or less standard classical logic notions and notations
(Section 2). In the end we shall mention some other approaches to updates (Section 8).
2. Preliminaries
The language is built from a possibly infinite set of atoms ATM = {p,q, r, . . .} with the
classical connectives ∧,∨,¬,⊥,>. L,L1, . . . denote literals, LIT is the set of all literals.
c, c1, . . . denotes clauses, i.e., disjunctions of literals. A,B,C, . . . denote formulas. We
confuse belief bases (that are finite sets) with the conjunction of their elements. As far as
possible we shall use B,B1, . . . for belief bases, and A,A1, . . . for inputs (formulas to be
added).
We stipulate that ¬ binds stronger than ∧ and ∨, which bind stronger than the other
connectives. We denote by atm(A) the set of atoms appearing in the formula A. For
example, atm(p ∧ (p ∨ q))= {p,q}, atm(⊥)= atm(>)= ∅.
An atom p occurring in A is redundant if there is an equivalent formula A′ where p
does not occur. Hence p’s truth value does not affect the truth value of A. For example p
is redundant in q ∧ (q ∨p). In order to establish that an atom is redundant one can use the
following fact.
Fact 1. An atom p is redundant in a formula A iff A[p\>]↔A[p\⊥].
Fact 2. To check redundancy of an atom is a coNP-complete problem.
Fact 1 shows us that it is in coNP. The other way round, we can polynomially transform
the problem of theoremhood of a formula A in the propositional calculus into that of
the redundancy of p in A[p1\p] ∧ · · · ∧ A[pn\p], where atm(A) = {p1, . . . , pn} and
p /∈ atm(A).
Fact 1 can be turned into an algorithm to get rid of redundant atoms. We note A↓ the
formula obtained by eliminating of all redundant atoms. For example, (q ∧ (q ∨ p))↓= q ,
(p ∨¬p)↓=>, ((p ∧¬p)∧ q)↓=⊥.
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A clause c is an implicate of A iff A→ c. An implicate c is prime iff for all implicates
c′ of A such that c′ → c we have c→ c′. A set D of prime implicates is a covering of A
iff for every clause c such that A→ c there is c′ ∈D such that c′ → c.
Fact 3. If D is a covering set of prime implicates of A then D ↔ A and atm(D) =
atm(A ↓).
Another name for a covering set of prime implicates is Blake canonical form [3]. Note
that there may be several sets of prime implicates covering a given formula.
Fact 3 can also be used to get rid of redundant atoms (this has been proposed by [9]).
Nevertheless, the number of prime implicates can be exponential in the length of the
original formula. Therefore the algorithm based on Fact 1 is preferable.
Interpretations are sets of atoms. We shall often represent an interpretation by a
maximally consistent set of literals. 2ATM is the set of all interpretations (which might
be viewed as possible worlds). Given a formula A, we note [[A]] the set of interpretations
where A is true. A is valid if [[A]] = 2ATM.
The notion of distance between interpretations is a central device in update operations.
The distance between w and v is the set of atoms whose truth value differs:
DIST(w,v)= (w \ v) ∪ (v \w)
= {p: w ∈ [[p]] and v /∈ [[p]]} ∪ {p: w /∈ [[p]] and v ∈ [[p]]}.
For example, suppose ATM = {p,q, r}, w = {p,q,¬r} and v = {p,¬q, r}. Then
DIST(w,v)= {q, r}.
3. Proposals for update operations
In this section, we present the proposals for concrete update operations that can be found
in the literature that are not explicitly ordering-based.
Formally, an update operation is a function (noted ) mapping a belief base B and an
inputA to a new belief base B A. According to the explanation of updates in Section 1.1,
belief bases should be updated world by world. Therefore, let w ∈ [[B]], and let w ·A be
the set of interpretations resulting from the update of w by A. Then the models of B A
should be the collection of updates of each model of B by A. Formally, we should have
[[B A]] =
⋃
w∈[[B]]
w ·A.
Each operation is thus defined by associating to an interpretation and an input a set of
interpretations. Basically there are two families of approaches. The first one works by
minimizing distances between worlds, while the second constrains distances to be in some
set of exceptions computed from the input.
We set the following parenthesis conventions: ¬ binds stronger than , which binds
stronger than the others (although  is not in the object language).
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3.1. PMA: Minimal change
The Possible Models Approach (PMA), was introduced by Winslett in [37] in the context
of reasoning about action and change. It is based on minimization of the distance DIST
between interpretations.
LetA be the formula representing the incoming information (the input). Then the update
of w by [[A]] is defined as:
w ·pma [[A]] =
{
u ∈ [[A]] :∀u′ ∈ [[A]], DIST(w,u′) 6⊂DIST(w,u)}.
In other terms, the set w ·pma [[A]] contains all those elements of [[A]] that are minimal with
respect to the closeness ordering 6w , where 6w is defined by
u6w v iff DIST(w,u)⊆DIST(w,v).
Every 6w is a partial pre-order over interpretations.
Example 4. For w= {¬p,¬q} and A= p∨ q , we get [[A]] = {{p,q}, {¬p,q}, {p,¬q}},
DIST(w, {p,q}) = {p,q}, DIST(w, {¬p,q}) = {q} and DIST(w, {p,¬q}) = {p}. Thus
the models ofAwhich are minimal for distance set inclusion are {{¬p,q}, {p,¬q}}. Hence
we get w ·pma [[p ∨ q]] = {{¬p,q}, {p,¬q}}.
The computational complexity of the PMA is 5p2-complete [11].
3.2. FORBUS: Numeric minimal change
The operation proposed by Forbus in [15] is stronger than the PMA. It is the update
counterpart of Dalal’s semantics for belief revision [5]. There, the semantical update
operation is defined not from the distance between interpretations DIST(w,u), but from
its cardinality card(DIST(w,u)):
w ·Forbus [[A]]
= {u ∈ [[A]], ∀v ∈ [[A]]: card(DIST(w,u))6 card(DIST(w,v))}.
The resulting set of interpretations contains those models of A that are minimal with
respect to the closeness ordering 6w , where 6w is defined by
u6w v iff card(DIST(w,u))6 card(DIST(w,v)).
Every 6w is a total pre-order over interpretations. On Example 4, Forbus’ operation
behaves just as the PMA.
Example 5. Let w = {¬p,¬q,¬r} and A be (p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ r) ∧ (q ∨ ¬r). Hence
[[A]] = {{p,¬q,¬r}, {¬p,q, r}, {p,q, r}, {p,q,¬r}}. The cardinalities of the distances
between w and the models of A are, respectively (1,2,3,2). Then we get w ·Forbus [[A]] =
{{p,¬q,¬r}}.
This illustrates that FORBUS is different from the PMA. The computational complexity
of FORBUS is 5p2-complete [11].
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3.3. MCD: Going beyond the PMA
Both PMA and FORBUS have been criticized for their handling of disjunctive input.
It has been argued that input such as p ∨ q in Example 4 is interpreted as if it was an
exclusive disjunction p ⊕ q (see Section 6). Motivated by that, Minimal Change with
Maximal Disjunctive inclusion (MCD), was introduced by Zhang and Foo in [39]. We
give a reformulation which is more appropriate for our purposes, and which illustrates how
MCD is built on top of the PMA.
Let U be the set of models of the input A, and let w be some interpretation. Let
V =w ·pma U be the set of models resulting from PMA-updatingw with U , and let S = 2V .
For s ∈ S, the ‘cone’ C(s) is the set of those interpretations in U that are beyond all
elements of s with respect to the PMA closeness ordering6w:
C(s)= {u ∈U : ∀v ∈ s, v 6w u}.
The set {C(s): s ∈ S} is a covering of U : U =⋃{C(s): s ∈ S}. The key idea is that PMA-
minimization in that set allows to obtain more interpretations than w ·pma U would give
us:
w ·mcd U =
⋃
s∈S
w ·pma C(s).
Example 6. Let w = {¬p,¬q} and let A be p ∨ q , we have V = w ·pma [[p ∨ q]] =
{w1,w2}, where w1 = {p,¬q} and w2 = {¬p,q}. Second, S = {∅, {w1}, {w2}, {w1,w2}}.
We construct C(∅) = {w1,w2, {p,q}}, C({w1}) = {w1, {p,q}}, C({w2}) = {w2, {p,q}},
and C({w1,w2})= {{p,q}}.
Finally
w ·mcd [[p ∨ q]] =w ·pma {w1,w2, {p,q}} ∪w ·pma {w1, {p,q}}
∪w ·pma {w2, {p,q}} ∪w ·pma {{p,q}}
= {w1,w2} ∪ {w1} ∪ {w2} ∪ {p,q} = {w1,w2} ∪ {p,q}.
Together with Example 4 this illustrates that MCD is different from the PMA. The
computational complexity of MCD is 5p2-complete [29].
3.4. MCD*: Iterating MCD
In [22] it has been shown that MCD fails to capture the intuitions that have been put
forward in [39] (see Section 6), and an iterative version MCD* of MCD is introduced as
a correction for MCD. It behaves as MCD if for every subset of the set w ·pma U there is
only one model of the input which is minimally beyond all its elements. This means that
w ·pma C(s) is a singleton for all s ⊆ w ·pma U . When there are two or more, contrarily to
MCD, MCD* continues to look for interpretations which are beyond, and so on.
Formally, let U be the set of models of the inputA, VU =w ·pmaU , SU = 2VU , and CU(s)
the subset of U defined as before (i.e., CU(s)= {u ∈ U : ∀v ∈ s, v 6w u}). We use here a
notation different from the above (i.e., we index S and C by U ) because inputs are not
A. Herzig, O. Rifi / Artificial Intelligence 115 (1999) 107–138 115
the same at each step of our inductive definition. Then we define ·mcd* recursively as the
smallest set such that:
w ·mcd* U =

w ·pma U if card(w ·pma U)6 1,⋃
s∈SU
w ·mcd* CU(s) otherwise.
Example 7. Let w = {¬p,¬q,¬r,¬t}, U = [[(p ∨ q)∧ ((p ∧ q)→ (r ∨ t))]]. First
w ·pma U = {w1,w2} with w1 = {p,¬q,¬r,¬t} and w2 = {¬p,q,¬r,¬t}. Second,
we construct CU(s) for every s ∈ SU = {∅, {w1}, {w2}, {w1,w2}}. U1 = CU({w1}) =
{w1, . . .}, U2 = CU({w2}) = {w2, . . .}, and U3 = CU({w1,w2}) = {w3,w4,w5}, where
w3 = {p,q, r,¬t}, w4 = {p,q,¬r, t}, and w5 = {p,q, r, t}. Now we compute VU1 =
{w1}, VU2 = {w2}, and VU3 = {w3,w4}. Again, we construct the sets U31 = {w3, . . .},
U32 = {w4, . . .}, and U33 = {w5}. Then VU31 = {w3}, VU32 = {w4} and VU33 = {w5}.
Finally,
w ·mcd* U =w ·mcd* U1 ∪w ·mcd* U2 ∪w ·mcd* U3
where w ·mcd* U1 = VU1 = {w1}, w ·mcd* U2 = VU2 = {w2}, and w ·mcd* U3 = w ·mcd* U31 ∪
w ·mcd* U32 ∪ w ·mcd* U33. And w ·mcd* U31 = VU31 = {w3}, w ·mcd* U32 = VU32 = {w4} and
w ·mcd* U33 = VU33 = {w5}. Hence
w ·mcd* U = {w1,w2,w3,w4,w5}.
Note that w ·mcd U = {w1,w2,w3,w4}.
This illustrates that MCD* is different from MCD.
We conjecture that MCD* is PSPACE-complete. (We were not able to find a proof,
which seems to be involved.)
3.5. WSS: Minimal change with exceptions
Winslett’s standard semantics (WSS) [38] has received only little attention until recently.
It was intended to be the weakest operation deserving the name of update. It is attractive
because its definition is simple, and because it handles disjunctions correctly.
w ·wss A is the set of those models of A which preserve the truth value of atoms not
occurring in A. Formally:
w ·wss A=
{
u ∈ [[A]]: DIST(w,u)⊆ atm(A)}.
Example 8. Let w = {¬p,¬q,¬r}. Then w ·wss p ∨ q = [[(p ∨ q)∧¬r]]. And w ·wss
p ∨¬p = [[¬q ∧¬r]]. The last example illustrates that WSS is sensitive to syntax:
although p ∨¬p is logically equivalent to >, we have w ·wss > 6=w ·wss p ∨¬p.
WSS is coNP-complete [29].
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3.6. WSS↓: Making WSS syntax-insensitive
In fact WSS is syntax-sensitive in the input only, in the sense that the elimination of
redundant input atoms changes the result of the update. Therefore it is interesting to
combine WSS with preprocessing of the input to eliminate redundant atoms.
This has been proposed in [22]. Noting WSS↓ the resulting operation we have
w ·wss↓A=w ·wss A↓.
We shall show that this is equivalent to Hegner’s semantics for updates [19]. Hegner’s
original presentation is much more complex. He starts by eliminating redundant atoms in a
different manner. First, he defines the following notions: For a formulaA, the set of partial
models ofA, denotedLB(A) (called the literal base in [19]), is the set {u⊆ LIT such that u
is consistent and u ∈ [[A]]}. For L ∈ LIT, L is irrelevant forA if for every u ∈ LB(A),L ∈ u
implies that u\L ∈ LB(A). 6 u is minimal if it contains no irrelevant elements. u ∈ LB(A)
is complete if it is minimal, and for any other minimal v ∈ LB(A), u ⊆ v implies that
u= v. In fact the set {u ∈ LB(A),u is complete} is nothing but the set of prime implicants
of A. Finally, if w is the actual state of the world then we get
w ·Hegner A=
⋃
u∈LB(A), u is complete
insert[u][w]
where insert[u][w] = u∪ {L ∈w,¬L /∈ u}.
Example 9. Suppose w = {¬p,¬q}, and the input A is (p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ ¬q). Then
LB(A)= {{p}, {p,q}, {p,¬q}}. The only complete set is {p}, and w ·Hegner A= insert[{p}]
[{¬p,¬q}] = {p,¬q}.
Doherty et al. [9] have proposed a similar operation as a generalization of the PMA. It is
called the modified PMA (MPMA) and is defined as follows:
w ·mpma A=w ·Ppma [[A]]
and
w ·Ppma [[A]] = {u ∈ [[A]]: DIST(w,u)⊆ P }
where P = atom(A↓) is the set of non redundant atoms. 7
Example 10. Suppose w = {¬p,¬q}, and the input A is (p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ ¬q). Then
P = {p}. DIST(w, {p,q}) 6⊆ {p}, and DIST(w, {p,¬q})⊆ {p}. Thus w ·mpma A= {p,¬q}.
WSS↓, HEGNER and MPMA are equivalent.
6 In the original definition: if for every u ∈ LB(A), L ∈ u implies that both u\{L} and u\{¬L} are also in
LB(A).
7 To compute P , they propose to compute Blake canonical form of A (cf. Section 2). We note in passing that
this might cause exponential growth of A, and that it is preferable to use the algorithm derived from Fact 1.
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Lemma 11. w ·wss↓A=w ·Hegner A.
Proof. Suppose that there is no redundant atom in A. Then the set of u ∈ LB(A) which are
complete, is [[A]]. Hence w ·Hegner A= [[A]]. And w ·wss↓A= [[A]].
Suppose now that there is one redundant atom p ∈ atm(A), then
w ·wss↓A= [[A[p := >] ∧L]]
where atm(L)= p and w ∈ [[L]]. The u ∈ LB(A) such that u is complete, are those partial
models of A such that neither p nor ¬p ∈ u and for all other atoms q of A either q or ¬q
∈ u. Let L be the literal such that w ∈ [[L]] and atm(L)= p, then
w ·Hegner A=
⋃
u∈LB(A)
u is complete
u∪L
which is equal to w ·wss↓A. 2
Lemma 12. w ·mpma A=w ·wss↓A.
Proof. In the two operations, A is put in normal form without redundant atoms A↓.
Furthermore, v ∈ w ·mpma A is equivalent to DIST(w,v) ⊆ P which is equivalent to v ∈
w ·wss↓A. 2
It follows from the complexity of WSS together with Fact 2 that WSS↓ is coNP-complete.
3.7. MCE: Making WSS↓ conservative
Minimal change with exceptions (MCE) has also been proposed by Zhang and Foo in
[39], based on the same motivation as MCD. MCE has a more syntactical flavour than
MCD. Just as in WSS and WSS↓, the basic idea is that some atoms occurring in the
input should be exempted from minimization of change, i.e., they should not count when
distance between interpretations is computed. Such a principle being a priori very liberal,
it has two restrictions: first, redundant input atoms should be eliminated in a preprocessing
step, avoiding thus syntax-sensitivity. Second, all those consequences of the input that are
not already true in the current interpretation w should not be taken into account. Both
restrictions are achieved by computing prime implicates.
More formally, suppose that A is the input. Let D be a covering set of prime implicates
of A, and D′ the subset of D which contains all clauses not inferred by w:
D′ = {c ∈D: w /∈ [[c]]}.
Then the set exceptions EXC(A)= atm(D′) is exempted from minimization:
w ·mce A=
{
u ∈ [[A]] : ∀u′ ∈ [[A]],
DIST(w,u′)\EXC(A) 6⊂DIST(w,u)\EXC(A)}.
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Note that by Theorem 22 of Section 4 we can simplify:
w ·mce A=
{
u ∈ [[A]]: DIST(w,u)⊆ EXC(A)}.
MCE is the update version of Weber’s revision operation [36].
Example 13. Suppose w = {¬p,¬q,¬r}, and the input A is (¬p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ r).
A covering set of prime implicates for A is D = {¬p ∨ q,p ∨ r, q ∨ r}. The set
D′ is {p ∨ r, q ∨ r}. Thus EXC(A) = {p,q, r}. Hence for all models v of the input,
DIST(w,v)\EXC(A)= ∅. Then w ·mce A= [[A]].
MCE is 5p2-complete [29].
3.8. WSSdep and WSS↓dep: Enhancing WSS by dependence information
All the proposals up to now have problems with the handling of integrity constraints.
Motivated by that, Herzig defines in [20] a dependence function between atoms in order
to correctly handle such constraints. Formally, we suppose given a dependence function
dep mapping atoms to sets of atoms such that p ∈ dep(p) for all atoms p. Dependence is
extended to general formulas by stipulating dep(A)=⋃p∈atm(A) dep(p).
The idea of using dependence information is as follows: suppose p does not depend on
A. Then p should ‘survive’ an update by A: w ∈ [[p]] should imply w ·
wssdep A ⊆ [[p]].
On the contrary, if p depends on A then it should a priori be retracted: we neither
expect w ·
wssdep A ⊆ [[p]] nor w ·wssdep A ⊆ [[¬p]]. Then WSSdep is the operation obtained
by generalizing the condition DIST(w,u)⊆ atm(A) of WSS to DIST(w,u)⊆ dep(A):
w ·
wssdep A=
{
u ∈ [[A]]: DIST(w,u)⊆ dep(A)}.
Indeed, if dep(p)= {p} for all atoms p then we obtain the WSS.
Example 14. If we have dep(p)= {p, r} then we get
{¬p,¬q,¬r} ·
wssdep p = {{p,¬q, r}, {p,¬q,¬r}}.
It is then straightforward to define also WSS↓dep by combining WSSdep and input
preprocessing in order to eliminate redundant atoms:
w ·wss↓dep A=w ·wssdep A↓.
Liberatore [29] shows that WSSdep is coNP-complete. With Fact 2, we deduce that WSS↓dep
is coNP-complete, too.
3.9. MPMA: Enhancing WSS↓ by causality information
In a similar but different approach, Doherty et al. [9] used causal connections between
formulas. Formally, there is a relation A C, where A and C are formulas, respectively,
referred to as an antecedent and a consequent of the causal rule. This rule has the following
intuitive interpretation:
• The formula A→ C holds in both the initial and the updated knowledge base.
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• If ¬A held in the initial knowledge base and A holds in the updated one, then there is
a cause for C to hold in the updated knowledge base.
A causal rule A C is said to be active with respect to a pair of interpretations 〈w,u〉 iff
w /∈ [[A]] and u ∈ [[A]], i.e., A is false in w and true in u.
The set of atoms P is now indexed by interpretations and augmented by atoms occurring
in the consequents of active causal rules. Suppose that A is the input without redundant
atoms and CR = {Ai  Ci} is the set of causal rules, where Ai and Ci are without
redundant atoms. Then
P(A,w,u)= atm(A)∪
⋃{
atm(Ci : Ai  Ci is active with respect to 〈w,u〉
}
.
Finally 8
w ·mpma A=
{
u ∈ [[A]], DIST(w,u)⊆ P(A,w,u)}.
Example 15. Suppose w = {¬p,¬q,¬r}, the input is p ∧ q , and the causal rule is
p ∧ q  r . There are two models of the input: u1 = {p,q,¬r} and u2 = {p,q, r}.
The causal rule is active with respect to u1 and u2. Then Pu1 = Pu2 = {p,q, r}, and
DIST(w,u1)⊆ Pu1 and DIST(w,u2)⊆ Pu2 . Hence w ·mpma p ∧ q = {u1, u2}.
It is straightforward to establish that MPMA is coNP-complete (assuming that
computing P(A,w,u) is in polynomial time).
4. Putting things in order
What is the relation between all theses updates operations? We give some theorems and
lemmas to situate each of them with respect to the others.
Lemma 16. w ·Forbus [[A]] ⊆ w ·pma [[A]] for all w and A, and there are w and A such that
w ·Forbus [[A]] 6=w ·pma [[A]].
Proof. Let u ∈ w ·Forbus A, and suppose now that u /∈ w ·pma [[A]]. Then there exists v ∈
w ·pma [[A]] such that DIST(w,v) ⊂ DIST(w,u). This implies that card(DIST(w,v)) <
card(DIST(w,u)) which contradicts the hypothesis. That PMA and FORBUS are different
is shown by Example 5. 2
Lemma 17. w ·pma [[A]] ⊆ w ·mcd [[A]] for all w and A, and there are w and A such that
w ·pma [[A]] 6=w ·mcd [[A]].
Proof. By definition of MCD, and by Example 6. 2
Lemma 18. w ·mcd A ⊆ w ·mcd* A for all w and A, and there are w and A such that
w ·mcd A 6=w ·mcd* A.
8 The original definition involves handling of integrity constraints. We have preferred to separate this issue,
which is investigate in Section 7.
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Proof. By definition of MCD*, and by Example 7. 2
Lemma 19. There are w and A such that w ·mce A ⊂ w ·mcd [[A]] and there are w and A
such that w ·mcd [[A]] ⊂w ·mce A. 9
Proof. In Example 13 given for MCE, the model {¬p,q, r} of the input is a model
of the base updated under MCE, but it is not under MCD. In this example we have
therefore w ·mcd [[A]] ⊂w ·mce A. The other way round, take w = {¬p,¬q,¬r} and [[A]] =
{{¬p,q,¬r}, {p,¬q,¬r}, {p,q, r}}. Then we get w ·mce A = {{¬p,q,¬r}, {p,¬q,¬r}}
and w ·mcd [[A]] = [[A]]. 2
Together with Lemma 18, Lemma 19 shows that we cannot compare MCE with MCD
and MCD*. In order to give a relation between PMA and MCE, we give a new update
operation based on models which is equivalent to MCE.
Lemma 20. If a literal L occurs in a prime implicate of A then there is w ∈ [[A]] such that
w ∈ [[L]].
Proof. Suppose that L ∨ c is a prime implicate of A, where L is a literal and c is a
disjunction of literals. Suppose now that ∀w ∈ [[A]],w ∈ [[¬L]], then A→ ¬L. This
implies that A→ c. And so L∨ c cannot be prime. 2
Theorem 21. Let PI(A) be a covering set of prime implicates of A. Let C1 be the set of
clauses of PI(A) true in w, and C2 = PI(A)\C1. Then
w ·pma [[C1 ∪C2]] =w ·pma [[C2]].
Proof. Let L1 ∨ · · · ∨Ln be a clause of C1, C = C1\(L1 ∨ · · · ∨Ln)∪C2. We will prove
by induction that w ·pma [[(L1 ∨ · · · ∨Ln)∪C]] =w ·pma [[C]].
From left to right. Let v ∈ w ·pma [[(L1 ∨ · · · ∨Ln)∪C]]. Suppose that v /∈ w ·pma [[C]]
which implies that ∃ v′ such that v′ ∈w ·pma [[C]] and DIST(w,v′)⊂DIST(w,v). We have
also v′ /∈ [[L1 ∨ · · · ∨Ln]], thus v′ ∈ [[¬L1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Ln]]. By hypothesis, we have w ∈
[[L1 ∨ · · · ∨Ln]]. In particular, we can consider thatw ∈ [[L1]]. So atm(L1) ∈DIST(w,v′).
Let’s take now the interpretation v′′ such that DIST(v′, v′′)= atm(L1). In other words, v′
and v′′ differ only in L1 and DIST(w,v′′)⊂DIST(w,v′). We will prove now that v′′ ∈ [[C]]
which permits to conclude that v′ /∈w ·pma [[C]]. For every clause in C, if it does not contain
atm(L1) then v′′ is a model for it, it is also a model if the clause is of the form L1 ∨ · · ·. If
the clause is of the form ¬L1 ∨ R, where R is a disjunction of literals not containing L1
then because of the structure of C, the clauses (L2 ∨ · · · ∨Ln ∨R) ∈ C. This implies that
v′ ∈ [[R]]. v′ and v′′ differ only by L1, and R does not contain L1, hence v′′ ∈ [[R]], too.
Thus v′′ ∈ [[C]].
From right to left. Let v ∈ w ·pma [[C]]. If v ∈ [[L1 ∨ · · · ∨Ln]] then v ∈ w ·pma
[[(L1 ∨ · · · ∨Ln)∪C]]. Suppose that v /∈ [[L1 ∨ · · · ∨Ln]]. Let v′ be the interpretation
9 Contrary to what is said in [39], where it is stated that MCE and MCD are the same operation.
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such that DIST(v, v′) = atm(L1), thus we have v′ ∈ [[L1 ∨ · · · ∨Ln]] and DIST(w,v′) ⊂
DIST(w,v). For every clause in C, if it doesn’t contain atm(L1) or it is of the form L1∨· · ·
then v′ is a model for it. If it is of the form ¬L1 ∨R then like above C contains clauses of
the form L2 ∨ · · · ∨Ln ∨R. By hypothesis v ∈ [[C]]. Hence v ∈ [[R]] and because R does
not contain L1 we have v′ ∈ [[R]]. Thus v′ ∈ [[C]], which implies that v /∈w ·pma [[C]]. 2
Theorem 22. Let PI(A) be a covering set of prime implicates of A. Let C1 be the set of
clauses of PI(A) true in w, and let C2 = PI(A)\C1. Then
atm(C2)=
⋃
v∈w·pma[[A]]
DIST(w,v).
Proof. Note that EXC(A)= atm(C2).
From left to right. Let p ∈ atm(C2) then ∃ c ∈ C2 such that
p ∈ atm(c), and by hypothesis w ∈ [[¬c]]. (1)
We must prove that ∃ v ∈w ·pma [[A]] such that p ∈DIST(w,v). Suppose the contrary, then
∀v ∈w ·pma [[A]], p /∈DIST(w,v). (2)
(1) implies that c↔ (p ∨ c′), w ∈ [[¬p]] and w ∈ [[¬c′]].
(2) implies that
∀v ∈w ·pma [[A]], v ∈ [[¬p]] and v ∈ [[c′]]. (3)
Let u ∈ [[A]] such that u ∈ [[p]] (u exists, Lemma 20) then (3) implies that ∃v,DIST(w,
v) ⊂ DIST(w,u), w ∈ [[¬c′]] and v ∈ [[c′]], thus ∃q ∈ DIST(w,v) such that q causes
that v ∈ [[c′]] and q ∈ DIST(w,u), which implies that u ∈ [[c′]]. Finally we conclude that
∀u ∈ [[A]] such that u ∈ [[p]] we have u ∈ [[c′]]. And for all u ∈ [[A]] such that u ∈ [[¬p]] we
have u ∈ [[c′]]. Thus ∀u ∈ [[A]], u ∈ [[c′]] which implies that c′ ∈ C2. Hence by definition
of C2, p ∨ c′ could not be in C2.
From right to left. Let
p ∈
⋃
v∈w·pma[[A]]
DIST(w,v),
then ∃v ∈w ·pma [[A]] such that p ∈DIST(w,v). We suppose that w ∈ [[¬p]], and v ∈ [[p]].
We must prove that ∃c ∈ PI(A) such that p ∈ atm(c) and w ∈ [[c]] (i.e., c ∈C2).
Suppose that there is no clause in PI(A) containing p, so the truth value of A is
independent of that of p, thus for every u ∈ [[A]] such that u ∈ [[p]] there exists u′ ∈ [[A]]
such that u ∈ [[¬p]] and DIST(u,u′)= {p}. Which implies that there exists v′ ∈ [[A]] such
that DIST(v, v′)= {p}, and DIST(w,v′)⊂DIST(w,v) which implies that v /∈w ·pma [[A]].
Thus there exists c ∈ PI(A) such that p ∈ atm(c).
It remains to prove that for some c ∈ PI(A) containing p, w ∈ [[¬c]]. Suppose the
contrary, i.e., for all c ∈ PI(A) containing p, w ∈ [[c]]. Let c2 be the conjunction of
clauses of PI(A) that are false in w, and let c1 be the conjunction of the rest. By
Theorem 21, we have w ·pma (c1 ∧ c2) = w ·pma c2. Thus v ∈ [[w ·pma c2]]. Like above, there
exists v′ ∈ [[w ·pma c2]], such that DIST(v, v′)= {p}, and DIST(w,v′)⊂DIST(w,v), which
contradicts the hypothesis. 2
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Theorem 23. w ·pma [[A]] ⊆ w ·mce A for all w and A, and there are w and A such that
w ·pma [[A]] 6=w ·mce A.
Proof. Let v ∈ w ·pma [[A]]. Then by Theorem 22 DIST(w,v) ⊆ EXC(A), so DIST(w,v)\
EXC(A)= ∅ which implies that v ∈w ·mceA. That PMA and MCE are different is shown by
Example 13. (It follows also from the inclusion in Lemma 17 and 18 and the non-inclusion
in Lemma 19.) 2
Theorem 24. w ·mce A ⊆ w ·wss A for all w and A, and there are w and A such that
w ·mce A 6=w ·wss A.
Proof. Let u ∈w ·mceA then DIST(w,u)⊆ EXC(A) and we have EXC(A)⊆ atm(A). Thus
u ∈w ·wss A. The following example shows the difference.
Example 25. Supposew = {¬p,¬q,¬r} and the inputA is (¬p∨q)∧ (q∨ r). w ·wssA=
[[A]] and w ·mce A= [[A]]\{{p,q,¬r}, {p,q, r}}.
This ends the proof of the theorem. 2
5. The status of the KM-postulates
Katsuno and Mendelzon [24] have proposed eight postulates that they claim every
rational update operation should satisfy. They have established that the PMA and FORBUS
satisfy all the KM-postulates. In this section we check each of these postulates with respect
to the update operations that we have introduced. For completeness we also prove the
results for the PMA and FORBUS that were already in [24].
We also discuss the plausibility of those postulates that are controversial with respect to
our official reading of updates. 10
In the end of the section we give a characterization result for WSSdep in terms of a set of
postulates.
5.1. (U1) B A→ A
(U1) stipulates input priority: whatever the content of B is, every update satisfies the
input. ((U1) has also been called the success postulate.)
This is an uncontroversial postulate. 11
Theorem 26. (U1) is satisfied by every update operation.
Proof. Straightforward. 2
10 There is a ninth postulate that is only satisfied by FORBUS and Boutilier’s approach [1]. We do not discuss
it here because it requires total orders, while in the sequel we shall criticise already the partial order semantical
base of the KM framework.
11 There are criticisms arguing that input has not necessarily priority over the base. But this means that we are
rather speaking about belief base fusion. Clearly such operations obey different postulates [26].
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5.2. (U2) If B→ A then B A↔ B
(U2) says that nothing needs to be changed if the input is vacuous in the sense that it is
already among the consequences of the base. (U2) can be decomposed into two postulates
“If B → A then B→ B A” and “If B → A then B A → B”.
Lemma 27. (U2) is equivalent to
(U2.1) B ∧A → B A
(U2.2) (B ∧A) A → B .
Proof. If we replace B by B ∧A in the first postulate then we get B ∧A→ B A. The
other way round (U2.1) and B→A imply that B→ B A.
To prove (U2.2) from the second postulate, it is sufficient to replace B by B ∧A in the
latter. The other way round, (U2.2) and B→A imply that B A→B . 2
Theorem 28. (U2.1) is satisfied by every update operation.
Proof. It suffices to prove that if w ∈ [[A]] then w ∈ w · A. Due to the ordering strength
on the operations that we have established in the previous section, it is sufficient to
prove that FORBUS satisfies (U2.1). Let w ∈ [[A]]. Then card(DIST(w,w)) = 0 and
w ·Forbus [[A]] = {w}. 2
Theorem 29. (U2.2) is satisfied exactly by FORBUS, PMA, MCD, MCD*, MCE.
Proof. Due to the structure of the update operations in order to prove that FORBUS, PMA,
MCD, MCD*, MCE satisfy (U2.2), it is sufficient to prove that MCD* and MCE satisfy
(U2.2).
Let v ∈ [[(B ∧A) MCD* A]], then ∃w ∈ [[B ∧A]] such that v ∈ w ·mcd* [[A]]. As w ·pma
[[A]] = {w} (because DIST(w,w)= ∅), we must have w ·mcd* [[A]] = {w}. Thus v =w and
v ∈ [[B]].
Now, let v ∈ [[(B ∧A) MCE A]], then ∃w ∈ [[B ∧A]] such that v ∈w ·mce A. As w ∈ [[A]],
we must have EXC(A)= ∅, and hence w ·mce A= {w}. Thus v =w and v ∈ [[B]].
To see that the other operations do not satisfy (U2.2), consider the base p and the input
p∨ q . We have p  (p ∨ q)= p∨ q , for  = WSS↓ or any weaker operation (in particular,
for every dependence relation). 2
Corollary 30. (U2) is satisfied exactly by FORBUS, PMA, MCD, MCD*, MCE.
The instance of (U2) where A is tautologous is uncontroversial:
Theorem 31. Every update operator satisfies (U2>) B >↔ B .
Discussion
So it is (U2.2) that is controversial, while (U2.1) is not. We agree with the viewpoints
of [1,2,9,10] and others, who have argued that (U2) should be abandoned. Consider the
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example in the proof of Theorem 29 discriminating violation of (U2.2). If we take seriously
our hypotheses of Section 1.3 then p  (p ∨ q) cannot be equivalent to p. Indeed, suppose
an agent believes p. Suppose later on he gets sensor information expressed by the formula
p ∨ q . Given that time has passed, maintaining belief in p means that the agent prefers to
consider that sensing got noisy in an otherwise unchanged world, instead of correct sensing
in an evolving world. But it is at least unjustified to always make such a hypothesis.
To witness, suppose with [2] that p means that a certain coin shows heads, and q that
it shows tails, and that the agent perceives that another agent grasps the coin and tosses it
(but without perceiving the outcome). Then clearly p  (p ∨ q) should be p ∨ q , and not
p.
Our rejection is supported by the discussion on the conditional logic principles (MP)
and (CS), that are, respectively, equivalent to (U2.1) and (U2.2) [21,34]. (MP) is generally
accepted, while (CS) is rejected by most of the authors [28,31,32].
5.3. (U3) If B and A are consistent, then B A is consistent
The consistency postulate says that inconsistency of the updated base comes from either
inconsistency of the original base, or inconsistency of the input.
(U3) is uncontroversial.
Theorem 32. (U3) is satisfied by every update operation.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Note that for WSSdep and WSS↓dep it is essential that
p ∈ dep(p). 2
5.4. (U4) If B1↔ B2 and A1↔A2 then B1 A1↔ B2 A2
(U4) stipulates that update operations should not be sensitive to the syntactical
formulation of the belief base and the input. This has been called the principle of
irrelevance of syntax in [5].
It would make no sense to accept that principle for belief bases without accepting it for
the input. We nevertheless decompose (U4) into
(U4.1) If B1↔ B2 then B1 A↔B2 A
(U4.2) If A1↔A2 then B A1↔ B A2.
Theorem 33. (U4.1) is satisfied by every update operation.
Proof. SupposeB1↔ B2. For all update operations , belief bases are updated modelwise.
Therefore [[B1 A]] = ⋃w∈[[B1]]w · A and [[B2 A]] = ⋃w∈[[B2]]w · A. As [[B1]] =[[B2]], [[B1 A]] and [[B2 A]] are equal. 2
Theorem 34. (U4.2) is satisfied exactly by FORBUS, PMA, MCD, MCD*, MCE, WSS↓,
WSS↓dep, MPMA, MPMA.
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Proof. For FORBUS, PMA, MCD, MCD*, this follows from the fact that not the input
formula is considered but its set of models. For the rest, this follows from the fact that
redundant atoms are eliminated from inputs (cf. Section 3.6). 2
Discussion
We think that (U4) is a desirable property. Without such a requirement the result
of an update is “extremely dependent on the syntactic form of the belief base. Even
apparently meaningless distinctions . . . have an effect” [6]. For example, the belief bases
p∧q, p∧p∧q , and q∧p could be updated differently. We refer to, e.g., [6] for a detailed
critique. The same arguments support syntax-independence in the input.
We stress that the syntax-sensitive update operations are so in a weak way only, and can
be ‘saved’. Indeed, all approaches satisfy the weaker
(U4.2′) If A1↔A2 and atm(A1)= atm(A2) then B A1↔ B A2.
Now there is a simple way to enforce (U4.2): just put to work Fact 1 and eliminate
redundant atoms from the input. This exactly what is done in WSS↓, WSS↓dep, MPMA.
5.5. (U5) (B A)∧C→ B  (A∧C)
The postulate says that an update by A∧C is weaker than just adding C to the update by
A. In particular suppose B and A∧C are both consistent. Then B  (A∧C) is consistent
under (U3), while there is no guarantee that (B A)∧ C is consistent. (For example take
p for B, > for A, and ¬p for C.)
Lemma 35. (U5) is equivalent in the presence of (U1) and (U4) to
(U5′) B  (A1 ∨A2)→ (B A1)∨ (B A2). 12
Proof ([16, Formula 3.14]). First, (U5′) entails (U5): B A1↔ B  ((A1 ∧A2)∨ (A1 ∧
¬A2)) by (U4). By (U5′),
B  ((A1 ∧A2)∨ (A1 ∧¬A2))→ B  (A1 ∧A2)∨B  (A1 ∧¬A2).
Hence
B A1 ∧A2→ (B  (A1 ∧A2)∧A2)∨ (B  (A1 ∧¬A2)∧A2)
by classical logic. Then (U5) follows because B  (A1 ∧¬A2)∧A2 is inconsistent due to
(U1).
In the other sense, we start with a consequence of (U1):
B  (A1 ∨A2)→B  (A1 ∨A2)∧ (A1 ∨A2).
By classical logic,
B  (A1 ∨A2)→ (B  (A1 ∨A2)∧A1)∨ (B  (A1 ∨A2)∧A2).
12 (U5′) is the counterpart of the conditional logic axiom “conjunction in the antecedent” (CA) [21,34].
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Now (U5) gives us
B  (A1 ∨A2)∧A1→ (B  ((A1 ∨A2)∧A1),
and
B  (A1 ∨A2)∧A2→ (B  ((A1 ∨A2)∧A2).
By (U4), the consequences of the first material implication becomesB A1, and that of the
second B A2. Putting things together, we obtain B  (A1 ∨A2)→B A1 ∨B A2. 2
Although it is claimed in [39] that MCD and MCE satisfy (U5), this is not the case.
Indeed, the following example shows that MCD violates (U5′).
Example 36. Suppose MCD satisfies (U5′). Then we should have
{¬p,¬q} ·mcd [[(p ∨ q)]] ⊆ ({¬p,¬q} ·mcd [[p]])∪ ({¬p,¬q} ·mcd [[q]]).
We have seen that {¬p,¬q} ·mcd [[(p ∨ q)]] = [[p ∨ q]], and it is easy to check that
({¬p,¬q} ·mcd [[p]])= [[p ∧¬q]] and ({¬p,¬q} ·mcd [[q]])= [[¬p ∧ q]].
Then by the above we obtain p ∨ q→ (p ∧¬q)∨ (¬p ∧ q), which is not valid.
The same example shows that MCE also violates (U5). The same is the case for WSS,
WSS↓, WSSdep, WSS↓dep, MPMA, MPMA.
Theorem 37. Only FORBUS and PMA satisfy (U5).
Proof. The above example has already demonstrated that the other approaches do not
satisfy (U5).
We prove that the PMA satisfies (U5). Let v ∈ [[B PMA A∧C]] then there existsw ∈ [[B]]
such that v ∈ w ·pma [[A]] ∩ [[C]]. Suppose that v /∈ w ·pma [[A∧C]] then there exists v′ ∈
w ·pma [[A∧C]] such that DIST(w,v′)⊂DIST(w,v). This contradicts that v ∈w ·pma [[A]].
A similar proof can be sketched for FORBUS. 2
Discussion
We start with an innocent-looking consequence of (U5). 13
Lemma 38 [22]. (U1) and (U5) entail
(Exor) If B A1→¬A2 and B A2→¬A1 then
B  (A1 ∨A2)→A1⊕A2.
Proof. Suppose that B  A1 → ¬A2, and B  A2 → ¬A1. By (U5′) (which follows
from (U1) and (U5)), B  (A1 ∨ A2)→ B  A1 ∨ B  A2. By (U1), B  A1→ A1 and
13 The link between (U5) and the property (Exor) of the lemma had not been noticed before [22], and, e.g., [39]
claim that MCD satisfies (U1) and (U5) while avoiding an exclusive interpretation of the inclusive or.
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by hypothesis B  A1 → ¬A2. Thus B  A1 → A1 ∧ ¬A2. Symmetrically B  A2 →
A2 ∧¬A1. Finally we have
B  (A1 ∨A2)→ (A1 ∧¬A2)∨ (A2 ∧¬A1),
which is equivalent to B  (A1 ∨A2)→A1⊕A2. 2
The condition of (Exor) expresses thatA1 and A2 are in some sense independent of each
other.
(Exor) is undesirable under the hypotheses of Section 1. To witness, consider the case
where B→¬A2 and B→¬A1. Then independence corresponds to the preservation of
¬A2 under update by A1 (and vice versa), i.e., A1 does not undermine the belief that ¬A2.
According to (Exor), an update by the inclusive disjunction always leads to the exclusive
disjunction. But why should new information about an event such that A1 ∨ A2 make
us exclude that A1 ∧ A2? There seems to be no reason for that. This is illustrated by an
adaptation of Reiter’s example against the PMA (which is an instance of Example 36).
Example 39. Suppose you throw a coin on a chessboard. Suppose Black means “the coin
falls on a black field”, and White “the coin falls on a white field”. The coin might fall
either on a black field, or on a white field, or on both of them. Initially we hold the coin,
i.e., B is ¬Black ∧ ¬White. If we observe that the coin falls on a white field we should
keep on believing that ¬Black, and vice versa. This means that B  Black→¬White, and
B  White→ ¬Black. Now suppose that (due to our distance to the chessboard or the
observation angle) we can only see that the coin fell down, without perceiving its position.
This corresponds to an update with Black ∨ White. (Exor) tells us that we should have
B  (Black∨White)→ Black⊕White, i.e., the coin cannot touch a black and a white field
at the same time. This is clearly unintuitive.
As (U1) is uncontroversial, (U5) is the culprit and must be declared undesirable.
Remark 40. Circumscription and other minimization-based approaches behave in the
same way [12]. We note that this does not mean that (U5) and the exclusive interpretation
of disjunctions must be abandoned in the context of belief base revision and also
nonmonotonic reasoning. 14
5.6. (U6) If (B A1)→A2 and (B A2)→A1 then B A1↔ B A2
This means that if A1 and A2 are ‘equivalent under B’ then they lead to the same
update. 15
Lemma 41 [21]. (U6) is equivalent in the presence of (U1) and (U5) to
(U6′) If B A1→A2 then B  (A1 ∧A2)→B A1.
14 Thanks to David Makinson for an enlightening discussion on that point.
15 (U6) corresponds to the well-known conditional logic principle (CSO) [21,34].
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Proof. First (U6′) entails (U6): suppose we have B  A1 → A2. By (U6′) we have
B  (A1 ∧A2)→ B A1. Suppose now that we have B A2 → A1. By (U5) we obtain
(B A2)∧A1→B (A1∧A2). Hence B A2→B (A1∧A2). Thus (B A2)→B A1.
By symmetry we obtain B A1→ B A2.
In the other sense, by (U1) we have B  (A1∧A2)→A1∧A2. Hence B  (A1∧A2)→
A1. By hypothesis, we have B A1→A2. Hence B A1→A1 ∧A2. Then (U6) implies
B A1↔ B  (A1 ∧A2). 2
The preceding proof that (U6) entails (U6′) shows that (U6) entails (U2) in the presence
of (U2>): B  >↔ B and (U1). As well (U6) implies (U4.2) in the presence of (U1).
Theorem 42. Only FORBUS, PMA, MCD, MCD* and MCE satisfy (U6). 16
Proof. Suppose that the PMA does not satisfy the postulate, and suppose then there exists
v ∈ [[B PMA A1]] such that v /∈ [[B PMA A2]]. But by hypothesis v ∈ [[A2]]. This implies
that ∃w ∈ [[B]] such that v ∈ w ·pma [[A1]], and in particular v /∈ w ·pma [[A2]] so there exists
v′ ∈w ·pma [[A2]], DIST(w,v′)⊂DIST(w,v) and we have v′ ∈ [[A1]] by hypothesis, which
contradicts that v ∈w ·pma [[A1]].
For MCD, suppose idem that v ∈w ·mcd [[A1]], and v /∈w ·mcd [[A2]]. There are two cases.
For v ∈ w ·pma [[A1]], we have v ∈ w ·pma [[A2]] and so v ∈ w ·mcd [[A2]]. If it is not the case
then there exists v1, . . . , vn ∈w ·pma [[A1]] such that DIST(w,vi )⊂DIST(w,v) for all i and
for all v′ ∈ [[A1]] such that DIST(w,vi) ⊂ DIST(w,v′) for all i , we have DIST(w,v′) 6⊂
DIST(w,v). Now, by hypothesis v1, . . . , vn, v ∈ [[A2]], v1, . . . , vn ∈ w ·pma [[A2]] (because
the PMA satisfies (U6)), and v /∈w ·mcd [[A2]]. Then ∃v′ ∈w ·mcd [[A2]] as v above except that
DIST(w,v′)⊂DIST(w,v). As v′ ∈ [[A1]] by hypothesis, this implies that v /∈w ·mcd [[A1]]
[39].
For MCD*, we prove that by induction on the number of steps in the recursive definition
of w ·mcd* [[A]]. The base is proved by MCD. Suppose now that until step p, (U6) is
satisfied. Hence, we have v ∈ w ·mcd* [[A1]] at step p + 1, and there exists v1, . . . , vn ∈
w ·mcd* [[A1]] at step p such that DIST(w,vi) ⊂ DIST(w,v) for all i and for all v′ such
that DIST(w,vi) ⊂ DIST(w,v′) for all i , we have DIST(w,v′) 6⊂ DIST(w,v). Now,
by hypothesis v1, . . . , vn, v ∈ [[A2]], v1, . . . , vn ∈ w ·mcd* [[A2]] (because MCD* satisfies
(U6) at step p). Then v ∈ w ·mcd* [[A2]] (because, if it is not the case then there exists
v′ ∈ w ·mcd* [[A2]] as v above except that DIST(w,v′) ⊂ DIST(w,v). As v′ ∈ [[A1]] by
hypothesis, this implies that v /∈w ·mcd* [[A1]]).
For MCE, the proof follows from Theorem 22: let v ∈ [[B MCE A1]]. This implies
that there is w ∈ [[B]] such that v ∈ w ·mce A1. Hence DIST(w,v)\EXC(A1) = ∅. where
EXC(A1) represents the set of exceptions with respect to w and A1. Suppose w ·mce A1 ⊆
[[A2]], and w ·mce A2 ⊆ [[A1]]. Because w ·pma [[A1]] ⊆ w ·mce [[A1]], w ·pma [[A2]] ⊆ w ·mce A2
and the PMA satisfies (U6) then w ·pma [[A1]] =w ·pma [[A2]]. By Theorem 22,
EXC(A1)=
⋃
v∈w·pma[[A1]]
DIST(w,v).
16 In [40] only a weaker variant of (U6) is proved to hold for MCE.
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This implies that EXC(A1)= EXC(A2). By hypothesis v ∈ [[A2]], and
DIST(w,v)\EXC(A2)= ∅
which implies that v ∈w ·mce A2. Hence v ∈ [[B MCE A2]].
WSS, WSS↓, WSSdep, WSS↓dep, MPMA and MPMA do not satisfy (U6) because they do
not satisfy (U2). (We recall that all these operations satisfy (U1) and (U2>), and that we
have shown in the begining of the section that an update operator satisfying (U1), (U2>)
and (U6) also satisfies (U2).) 2
Discussion
(U6) entails (U2) in the presence of (U2>) [21]. As (U2>) is uncontroversial, our
criticism of (U2) transfers to (U6).
5.7. (U7) If B is complete then (B A1)∧ (B A2)→ B  (A1 ∨A2)
A formula B is complete iff for every formula A, either B→A or B→¬A. Therefore
(U7) makes sense only if the language is finite.
Without (U7) the postulates would not completely characterize the models given by
Katsuno and Mendelzon. This is probably the raison d’être of this postulate, which is
difficult to explain intuitively.
Theorem 43. (U7) is satisfied exactly by FORBUS, PMA, WSS and WSSdep.
Proof. For FORBUS, let u ∈w ·Forbus [[A1]]∩w ·Forbus [[A2]]. This implies for every v ∈ [[A1]],
card(DIST(w,v))> card(DIST(w,u))
and for every v ∈ [[A2]],
card(DIST(w,v))> card(DIST(w,u)).
Thus for every v ∈ [[A2]] ∪ [[A2]] = [[A1 ∨A2]], card(DIST(w,v))> card(DIST(w,u)),
which implies that u ∈w ·Forbus [[A1 ∨A2]].
For PMA, let u ∈w ·pma [[A1]] ∩w ·pma [[A2]] which implies for every v ∈ [[A1]],
DIST(w,v) 6⊆DIST(w,u)
and for every v ∈ [[A2]], DIST(w,v) 6⊆ DIST(w,u). Thus for every v ∈ [[A2]] ∪ [[A2]] =
[[A1 ∨A2]], DIST(w,v) 6⊆DIST(w,u), which implies that u ∈w ·pma [[A1 ∨A2]].
For WSS and WSSdep the proofs follows from the fact that
atm(A1 ∨A2)= atm(A1) ∪ atm(A2).
The rest of the update operations does not satisfy (U7). The following example is a
counterexample for MCD and MCD*.
Example 44. Suppose that [[A1]] = {{p,q,¬r}, {p,¬q, r}, {p,q, r}}, [[A2]] = {{p,¬q,
¬r}, {¬p,q,¬r}, {p,q, r}} and
w = {¬p,¬q,¬r}. {p,q, r} ∈w ·mcd [[A1]] ∩w ·mcd [[A2]]
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and
w ·mcd [[A1 ∨A2]] = {{p,¬q,¬r}, {¬p,q,¬r}, {p,q,¬r}}.
We have the same result for MCD*.
The following example is a counterexample for MCE. 17
Example 45. Suppose that [[A1]] = {{p,¬q,¬r}, {¬p,q, r}, {p,q, r}}, [[A2]] = {{¬p,q,
¬r}, {p,¬q, r}, {p,q, r}} and
w = {¬p,¬q,¬r}. {p,q, r} ∈w ·mce [[A1]] ∩w ·mce [[A2]]
and w ·mce [[A1 ∨A2]] = {{p,¬q,¬r}, {¬p,q,¬r}}.
The following example is a counterexample for WSS↓, WSS↓dep, MPMA.
Example 46. Suppose that
w= {¬p,¬q}. w ·wss↓ (p ∨ q)∩w ·wss↓ (¬p ∨¬q)
= {{¬p,q}, {p,¬q}}. w ·wss↓ (p ∨ q ∨¬p ∨¬q)=w ·wss↓> =w.
This ends the proof of the theorem. 2
Discussion
We claim that (U7) is almost meaningless: to consider complete belief bases does
not ‘give’ us very much, because even for finite languages belief bases are in general
incomplete, in the sense that they do not completely describe the actual world, but rather
several possible ones.
5.8. (U8) (B1 ∨B2) A↔ (B1 A)∨ (B2 A)
(U8) is the postulate corresponding to modelwise updating, which is at the base of the
standard explanation of updates.
(U8) is uncontroversial.
Theorem 47. (U8) is satisfied by every update operation.
Proof. By definition of an update. 2
17 This contradicts [39], where it is said that MCE satisfies (U7).
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5.9. From postulates to characterization theorems
Beyond property checking, one might ask whether it is possible to exactly characterize
the different operations by identifying further postulates. The only operations for which
this has been done are those of WSSdep (of which WSS is a particular case). 18
Theorem 48 (Characterization of WSSdep [22]).19 Suppose given a dependence relation
dep and an update operation . Then  is the WSSdepoperator iff  satisfies (U1), (U2.1),
(U4.1), (U8), and
(NI1) (B1 ∧B2) A↔ B1 ∧ (B2 A) if dep(A)∩ atm(B1)= ∅
(NI2) A→ (B A) if atm(B)⊆ dep(A) and B is consistent.
(NI1) and (NI2) are new postulates that are parametrized by dependence. We note that
language finiteness is not required for our axiomatization. Note also that (U2>) follows
from (NI1) and (NI2).
It has been shown that the above characterization can be turned in a decision
procedure [22].
6. The problem of disjunctive input
In the preceding section we have already pointed out that (U5) is closely related to an
undesirable exclusive interpretation of the inclusive disjunction. 20
As the PMA and FORBUS satisfy all the KM-postulates they are immediately subject to
our criticism. This can be illustrated by Example 39.
The other approaches have all been designed in a way such that (Exor) is avoided. In
the rest of the section we show that failure of (U5) and (Exor) is not enough to guarantee
correct handling of disjunctive input, and that MCD, MCD* and MCE fail to capture the
intuitions that have been put forward. The arguments are in terms of toy examples. WSS
and its relatives WSS↓, WSS↓dep and MPMA give the intuitive result at least for these
examples.
6.1. A counterexample against MCD
MCD handles Reiter’s Example 6 correctly. But consider Example 7 where w =
{¬p,¬q,¬r,¬s} and [[A]] = [[(p ∨ q)∧ ((p ∧ q)→ (r ∨ s))]]. Suppose that you hold a
coin with two hands, and you read p as ‘my left hand is open’, q as ‘my right hand is open’,
18 There is a characterization of the PMA in [14], but only in terms of conditional logic.
19 We have corrected an error in [22]: the equivalence in (NI1) is an implication there.
20 We can even strengthen Lemma 38, establishing that under its independence hypotheses and (U1), (U5)
and (U6), updates by inclusive disjunctions behave just as updates by exclusive disjunctions, in the sense
that B  (A1 ∨ A2)↔ B  (A1 ⊕ A2). (From Lemma 38 we obtain B  (A1 ∨ A2)→ A1 ⊕ A2. Now by
(U1) B  (A1 ⊕ A2)→ (A1 ⊕ A2). By classical logic, B  (A1 ⊕ A2)→ (A1 ∨ A2). Then (U6) says that
B  (A1 ∨A2)↔ B  (A1 ⊕A2).)
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r as ‘the coin falls in a white field’, and s as ‘the coin falls in a black field’. According to
the MCD, the result is equivalent to
((p⊕ q)∧¬r ∧¬s)∨ (p ∧ q ∧ (r ⊕ s)).
The interpretation {p,q, r, s} is not a model of the updated belief base. Hence the coin
cannot touch a black and a white field at the same time, which is clearly counterintuitive.
Thus the MCD interprets the nested inclusive disjunction r ∨ s by the exclusive one r ⊕ s.
This example motivated the introduction of MCD* in [22].
6.2. A counterexample against MCD* and MCE
Suppose we have to move a box around in a warehouse with two floors. Suppose that
p means “the box is in the bottom of the warehouse”, q means “the box is in the second
floor”, and r means “the box is on the right side”. Suppose initially the box is on the left
side of the front region, on the first floor, i.e., the belief base is {¬p,¬q,¬r}. Now suppose
we ask a robot to put the box somewhere else in the warehouse, but not in the bottom of
the first floor. This means that the box should be moved either on the second floor or in
the front of the right first floor side, i.e., the input is (¬p ∧ r)∨ q . Then we would expect
the result (¬p ∧ r)∨ q . Example 25 shows that with respect to MCE it is prohibited that
robot puts the box in the bottom of the second floor, while he could put it on the right side
of the second floor! In the two cases the robot will make the same ‘steps’ in the sense of
area change. Why one is preferred over the other? In the case of the PMA and FORBUS,
the robot would go right or go up. This corresponds to the fact that in these approaches the
‘steps’ the robot makes are minimized. MCD and MCD* behave as MCE.
7. The problem of handling integrity constraints
Integrity constraints are formulas that have a particular status: they must be guaranteed
to hold after every update. Update operations should take into account such constraints.
We view integrity constraints as a finite set of formulas IC which can be confused with
the conjunction of its elements, just as in the case of belief bases. Formally, what we are
interested in are update operations IC such that B IC A→ IC.
It has often been proposed (see, e.g., [23,37]) to define the update B IC A as B  (A∧
IC), for an appropriate update operation . This amounts to selecting the closest models
of A ∧ IC. By means of the following counterexample it has been shown by Ginsberg
(see, e.g., [30]) that such a proposal is problematic in particular if  is the PMA update
operator: let Up1 mean ‘switch 1 is up’, Up2 ‘switch 2 is up’, and Light ‘the light is on’.
Suppose there is a circuit such that the light is on exactly when both switches are in the
same position. Hence the integrity constraint is IC = (Up1 ↔ Up2)↔ Light. Let B be
Up1 ∧Up2 ∧ Light. Then one would expect that B  (¬Up1 ∧ IC)→¬Light. As well, we
would expect B  (¬Up1 ∧ IC)→Up2, i.e., the second switch does not move. It turns out
that neither is the case in the PMA, MCE, MCD*, MCD*, WSS, WSS↓.
In this section we concentrate on approaches that have been designed to correctly handle
such constraints, viz. WSSdep and MPMA. Both of them resort to causal notions. Indeed,
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one story to learn from Lifschitz’ counterexample above is that there are aspects of the
domain structure which cannot be expressed by classical integrity constraints. In [30],
Lifschitz proposes to distinguish between frame and non-frame atoms. We can recast
his solution in terms of a boolean dependence function. For example, the atom Light is
dependent, and this means that it is a secondary atom whose value is defined by primary
atoms such as Up1 and Up2.
Thielscher [35] has given a counterexample showing that such a categorization is too
simple. Basically, his argument is that in particular circumstances, every atom can be forced
to be dependent. He proposes a solution in the framework of reasoning about actions. It
is in terms of a dependence function mapping atoms to sets of atoms. (He uses the term
influence relation.) In the example, Light ∈ dep(Up1), but Up2 /∈ dep(Up1). Hence Light
depends on Up1, but Up2 does not depend on Up1: the update of any belief base by Up1 or
¬Up1 can never change the truth value of Up2.
MPMA is close to Thielscher’s approach. Here the integrity constraints are not
conjoined with the input, and thus no minimization is applied to them. Instead, they are
used to restrict the models of the update:
B MPMA,IC A= (B MPMA A)∧ IC∧ T (CR)
where T (CR) denotes the formula
∧n
i=1(Ai→Ci) whereAi  Ci are the causal rules. 21
Example 49. Let (Up1 ↔ Up2)  Light and ¬(Up1 ↔ Up2)  ¬Light be the causal
rules. {Up1,Up2,Light} ·mpma ¬Up1 = {{¬Up1,Up2,Light}, {¬Up1,Up2,¬Light}}.
The handling of integrity constraints in WSS↓dep is similar to that in MPMA. It has been
sketched in the framework of conditionals in [13,20]. Formally, given a set of integrity
constraints IC and a dependence function dep, we have
B WSS↓dep,IC A= (B WSS↓dep A)∧ IC.
Example 50. Let dep(Up1)= {Up1,Light}, dep(Up2) = {Up2,Light}, and dep(Light) =
{Light,Up1,Up2}. We have now
{Up1,Up2,Light} ·wss↓dep ¬Up1 = {{¬Up1,Up2,Light}, {¬Up1,Up2,¬Light}}.
Integrity constraints are then taken into account by dropping from ·wss↓dep and ·mpma
those interpretations which violate IC. In this way Light follows from the updated belief
base of the two examples if we simply drop the interpretation {¬Up1,Up2,Light}.
It remains to illustrate the differences between WSS↓dep, and MPMA: first, the
dependence function is a sort of weak causal connection, while in MPMA the causal
connection is a strong one. Dependence is a function which maps an atom to a set of
atoms, while in MPMA the causal connection is between formulas. We can also remark
that the causal connection in MPMA is transitive in the sense that the causal rules
{A B,B C} and {A B,B C,A C} lead to the same update operation. This is
not the case in WSS↓dep, due to the weak character of the causal connection.
All these differences make a formal comparison difficult.
21 The original definition in [9] is slightly different but equivalent.
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8. Other approaches
The approaches presented in this section are not in the tradition of those presented in
Section 3. We discuss them now in order to complete the picture and conclude that our
criticisms of the KM-postulates also apply to them.
The first approach is that of Boutilier in [1] in the framework of propositional knowledge
base update. The basic idea of his work is to combine revision and update, providing a more
realistic characterization of belief change. An incoming information about a change in the
world can lead an agent to revise his prior beliefs before updating it. Boutilier presents a
general model for update taking into account such considerations. The framework is based
on the notions of ranking, event and transition.
What we are interested in is the relationship between his model and that of KM. In fact,
his operator satisfies in the general case (U1), (U4), (U6), (U7) and (U9). But we have
rejected (U6): we have seen in Section 5 that (U6) implies (U6′) under (U1), which in turn
implies (U2) under (U2>). As Boutilier rejects (U2) he thus rejects (U2>). This is due to
his hypothesis that the input do not correspond necessarily to event. But this contradicts
our hypotheses of Section 1.3.
The same criticisms apply to Del Val and Shoham in [7]. They propose a theory of
update using the situation calculus in which frame and ramification problems can be solved
in a systematic way by default persistence of facts. They provide a relation between their
approach and the KM-postulates, and prove that their construction satisfies (U1), (U3),
(U5), (U6) and (U8). The undesirability of their operator is enforced by the presence of
(U5) and (U6).
Another framework far from the ones we have described was proposed by Reiter in [33],
using the situation calculus and theories of actions to perform update.
9. Summary and conclusion
Here we collect the main results of the paper.
(1) We have given an exhaustive analysis of the comparative strength of update
operators that have been proposed in the literature (Section 4). The graph of Fig. 1
illustrates that, where the upper operations are the stronger ones.
(2) We have checked satisfaction of the KM postulates. The results of Section 5 are put
together in Table 1.
The postulates (U1), (U3), and (U8) are uncontroversial. 22 The other postulates are
violated by most of the operations.
(3) We have carefully discussed the plausibility of the controversial postulates. We have
argued that (U4) is desirable, while (U2), (U5), and (U6) are not, and that (U7) is
without importance. We have also shown how (U4) can be enforced in a simple way.
In the KM framework, (U5) and (U6) are crucial if we want to give semantics to
update operations in terms of partial preorders on interpretations. Given our critical
22 We note that there are criticisms of (U3) as in [1,10]. They have mainly to do with the fact that logically
consistent inputs can be inconsistent with the domain laws—see our reformulation of (U3) below.
A. Herzig, O. Rifi / Artificial Intelligence 115 (1999) 107–138 135
Fig. 1. Ordering of strength (Section 4).
Table 1
Satisfaction of the KM-postulates (Section 5)
(U1) (U2) (U3) (U4) (U5) (U6) (U7) (U8)
FORBUS y y y y y y y y
PMA y y y y y y y y
MCD y y y y n y n y
MCD* y y y y n y n y
WSS y n y n n n y y
WSS↓ y n y y n n n y
MCE y y y y n y n y
WSSdep y n y n n n y y
WSS↓dep y n y y n n n y
MPMA y n y y n n n y
examination of these postulates, this means the other way round that we cannot
resort to such devices any longer when we look for semantics of update operations.
(4) We have thoroughly investigated updates with disjunctive input. We have shown in
Section 5 that it is (U5) which unintuitively makes inclusive disjunctions behave
just as exclusive ones. We have gone beyond that in Section 6 and have shown by
counterexamples that the operations MCD, MCD*, and MCE, while not satisfying
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(U5) still have that unintuitive feature, and therefore fail to do the job they were
designed for. Hence only WSS↓, WSS↓dep, MPMA, and MPMA correctly handle
disjunctive input.
(5) We have characterized one of the approaches WSS↓dep by a complete set of
postulates.
(6) Our last contribution is an account of integrity constraints handling. Only WSS↓dep
and WSSdep of [22] and MPMA of [9] resist to Lifschitz’ toy example. These two
approaches are based on dependence or causality information, and it seems that one
cannot do without such devices.
Let us add here that a realistic set of update postulates should take into account integrity
constraints. This can be done in a straightforward way by adding a further postulate (U0IC)
and adapting those postulates appealing to consistence.
Putting together our results on the plausibility of the KM postulates and our remark on
integrity constraints we obtain our official set of postulates.
(U0IC) B A→ IC
(U1) B A→A
(U2.1) B ∧A→B A
(U2>) B  >↔ B
(U3IC) If B and A are consistent with IC, then B A is consistent with IC
(U4.1) If B1↔ B2 then B1 A↔ B2 A
(U4.2) If A1↔A2 then B A1↔ B A2
(U8) (B1 ∨B2) A↔ (B1 A)∨ (B2 A).
It is difficult to give the form of postulates to the other requirement that we advocate, viz.
that inclusive input should not be interpreted exclusively.
Among the ten update operations that we have presented, only WSS↓dep and MPMA
have shown to fulfil the requirements and resist to all the counterexamples. The simplicity
of WSS↓dep and the fact that it is coNP-complete make us think that it is the most promising
approach for further investigations.
Finally, it remains to notice that the laws we consider are static in the sense that they rule
only one state of affairs. We agree with Reiter [33] that dynamic laws which rule at least
two states of affairs are an important issue. We have proposed in previous work to handle
such constraints by using a conditional operator [13]. Recent results on the interaction
between updates and conditionals support such an approach [4,21,34]. But this is beyond
the scope of the present paper.
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